Afghanistan was an unwinnable war. As British and American troops withdraw, discover this definitive account that explains why.

It could have been a very different story. British forces could have successfully withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2002, having done the job they set out to do: to defeat al-Qaeda. Instead, in the years that followed, Britain paid a devastating price for their presence in Helmand province.

So why did Britain enter, and remain, in an ill-fated war? Why did it fail so dramatically, and was this expedition doomed from the beginning? Drawing on unprecedented access to military reports, government documents and senior individuals, Professor Theo Farrell provides an extraordinary work of scholarship. He explains the origins of the war, details the campaigns over the subsequent years, and examines the West's failure to understand the dynamics of local conflict and learn the lessons of history that ultimately led to devastating costs and repercussions still relevant today.

'The best book so far on Britain's...war in Afghanistan' International Affairs

'Masterful, irrefutable... Farrell records all these military encounters with the irresistible pace of a novelist' Sunday Times

Prizes

Short-listed for Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History 2018 (UK)

Masterful, irrefutable… [Farrell] records all these military encounters with the irresistible pace of a novelist. -- Justin Marozzi * Sunday Times *
Authoritative and provocative… For its range and breadth, it is a tour de force and a must read -- Robert Fox * Evening Standard *
A devastating account of the Afghan saga -- Simon Jenkins * Guardian *
The best book so far on Britain's recent war in Afghanistan...also beautifully written...the new material which Farrell has unearthed is remarkable -- Tim Willasey-Wilsey * International Affairs *
There have been many books written on this subject, but Farrell's stupendous research, clear vision and succinct writing are likely to outlast them all -- Ahmed Rashid * Prospect *
Remarkable… It is full of anecdotes gleaned from hundreds of diligent interviews with the players on the ground. And for a devotee of military history, it is a delight… Farrell’s masterpiece of a must-read… Magnificent -- Sherard Cowper-Coles * The Times *
As a reminder of how not to prosecute a war in far-off place that has confounded the best efforts of many foreign powers over the centuries, Theo Farrell’s Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001-2014…is surely the last word on the subject -- Justin Marozzi * Evening Standard *
Theo Farrell has written the definitive history of what was effectively the Fourth Anglo-Afghan War. His encyclopaediac knowledge of the thirteen-year-long struggle derives from interviewing many of the key decision-makers – on both sides - as well as an intimate knowledge of all the written sources. Well-sourced, well-written and riveting, Unwinnable should be studied by politicians and in military academies across the West. ‘How to’ books abound; this is the ultimate ‘How not to’ book. -- Andrew Roberts, author of NAPOLEON THE GREAT
With its broad scope and detail, Unwinnable is akin to an official history in the finest of British historical tradition. In fact, whenever the official history does come out, it will find itself in stiff competition with Farrell’s work. -- Carter Malkasian * Joint Force Quarterly *
This penetrating and superbly researched book explains how the United Kingdom came to intervene in Afghanistan, how it tried to meet its objectives, and why these objectives could not be achieved. -- Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, author of STRATEGY: A HISTORY

Theo Farrell is Professor and Executive Dean of Law, Humanities and the Arts at the University of Wollongong, Australia. Previously he was Dean of Arts and Social Sciences at City, University of London and, before that, Head of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Professor Farrell has published several books on military and strategic affairs. He conducted a number of studies in Afghanistan for British authorities and ISAF Command. He remains a Visiting Professor in War Studies at King’s College London.