Published in 1999. This book provides a detailed analysis of the positions and strategies adopted by Britain during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference which concluded in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The main focus is on the questions of British policy coordination and the factors which determined the government’s position during the negotiations on European Political Union and European Monetary Union. This is the first major study which reconstructs the mechanisms of British policy making and notes the internal and external factors which shaped the construction of the government’s position on the major points of the negotiations. The hypothesis of the book is that domestic politics, primarily through the Prime Minister’s aim to maintain the unity of the Conservative Party, was the determining factor in shaping government policy. This view is based upon micro-level empirical analysis undertaken through a methodological approach of historical interpretation.

’...a comprehensive and well researched analysis of the British position during the crucial 1990/91 negotiations on the Treaty of Maastricht...gives valuable insights not only into the factors which influenced British decision-making on key European issues at the time but also into the strength and weaknesses of the mechanics of British European policy formulation...’ Professor J. Monar, University of Leicester, UK ’...a worthy attempt at unravelling the intertwined complexities of international negotiations and the pull of domestic politics...required reading.’ Journal of European Integration ’This book provides a detailed and useful account of the British government’s negotiations during the two intergovernmental conferences that led to the Maastricht treaty.’ Political Studies ’...an integrated account of the British Government’s negotiating strategy across the policy areas.’ European Access