Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior, first published in 1982, examines the question: for what purposes and under what conditions were Soviet leaders prepared to take risks in international relations? The first part of the book sets out to define the concept of risk and to examine its analytical relevance for foreign policy, its measurement and its relation to the dynamics of crisis. The second part consists of in-depth analysis of Soviet behavior in the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961. The third and last part compares Soviet policy in the two crises, and the actions of the two different leaderships, as well as relating it to Soviet behavior in other geographical areas.

Reviews from the 1982 publication:

‘Probably the best and most authoritative and certainly the most meticulously researched account of the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961.’ The Economist

‘This book of Hannes Adomeit’s is a special event for students of Soviet foreign policy. It is indispensable reading for anyone interested in a rigorous analysis of Soviet crisis behavior.’ Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University

‘Adomeit’s book is a fine synthesis of history, political analysis, and theories of decision making in as neatly reasoned and well-written a volume as one could wish for.’ Thane Gustafson, Georgetown University