When do citizens voluntarily comply with regulations rather than act out of fear of sanctions? Can the Public be Trusted? challenges prevailing regulatory paradigms by examining when democratic states can rely on voluntary compliance. Drawing on behavioral science, law, and public policy research, Yuval Feldman explores why voluntary compliance, despite often yielding superior and more sustainable outcomes, remains underutilized by policymakers. Through empirical analysis of policy implementation in COVID-19 response, tax compliance, and environmental regulation, Feldman examines trust-based governance's potential and limitations. The book presents a comprehensive framework for understanding how cultural diversity, technological change, and institutional trust shape voluntary cooperation. By offering evidence-based insights, Feldman provides practical recommendations for balancing trust, accountability, and enforcement in regulatory design. This book is essential reading for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners seeking to optimize regulatory outcomes through enhanced voluntary compliance. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

'A terrific and admirably subtle discussion of a crucial problem, and a major contribution to both social science and law. A big step forward for both theory and practice.' Cass R. Sunstein, Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University, and author of The Ethics of Influence
'In an era of declining trust in governments worldwide, this timely book explores the potential of voluntary compliance. Drawing upon extensive research from psychology, ethics, law and behavioral public administration, it examines how to foster genuine citizen cooperation through internalized motivation and trust-based governance. This work provides crucial insights for policymakers seeking to build a more just and effective society.' Lucia Riche, Cambridge University
'Recent discussions of regulation focus upon why public trust in legal, governmental and societal institutions and authorities is declining and the consequences for regulation. In this great book, broad in scope and deep in background, Feldman flips the script and asks when state institutions and authorities should base their regulatory strategies on the anticipation that they will have public cooperation. His book provides a broad and detailed review of social science findings identifying when regulatory strategies based upon the expectation of voluntary public cooperation work. It argues that voluntary cooperation can work and is often advantageous. The key to using this approach is creating a roadmap that identifies the factors shaping when regulators might reasonably rely upon the expectation that they can obtain voluntary cooperation, a roadmap which this book provides. This very valuable read will help authorities currently reluctant to rely on their ability to motivate willing public cooperation by suggesting when such reliance makes sense.' Tom Tyler, Yale University