"There is much to bee learned from this book.... Material Beings is a refreshing example of straight-on, full-speed metaphysics. Van Inwagen goes where his arguments lead him-and they lead him to some remarkable places indeed."
-Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

A fascinating, densely argued, and highly original book on the metaphysics of material objects. The objections van Inwagen raises to the standard views on material parthood are not easily answered. Moreover, his examination of the topic of personal identity is a significant contribution to the philosophy of the mind. * PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW *
Commonplace things such as hawks and handsaws pose philosophical problems at least as imposing as those presented by abstract objects such as numbers and divine beings. Van Inwagen argues vigorously for the view that our world contains... only living organisms, the activity of whose various parts constitute a life and against psychological accounts of personal identity. This gives only a rough idea of the contents of this rich and rewarding book. * REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS *
There is much to bee learned from this book.... Material Beings is a refreshing example of straight-on, full-speed metaphysics. Van Inwagen goes where his arguments lead him—and they lead him to some remarkable places indeed. * Philosophy and Phenomenological Research *

Peter van Inwagen is Research Professor of Philosophy at Duke University.