Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity - Great Debates in Philosophy
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity - Great Debates in Philosophy
paperback
Published:
25 November, 1995
Description
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.
Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
More Details
| Type | Book |
|---|---|
| ISBN13 | 9780631192114 |
| ISBN10 | 0631192115 |
| Number Of Pages | 240 |
| Item Weight | 363 g |
| Product Dimensions | 152 x 231 x 17 mm |
| Publisher / Reseller | John Wiley and Sons Ltd |
| Format | paperback |
Author's Bio
Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973), The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View (1986).
Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).