From the late imperial period until 1922, the British and French made private and government loans to Russia, making it the foremost international debtor country in pre-World War I Europe. To finance the modernization of industry, the construction of public works projects, railroad construction, and the development and adventures of the military-industrial complex, Russia's ministers of finance, municipal leaders, and nascent manufacturing class turned, time and time again, to foreign capital. From the forging of the Franco-Russian alliance onwards, Russia's needs were met, first and foremost, its allies and diplomatic partners in the developing Triple Entente. In the case of Russia's relationships with both France and Great Britain, an open pocketbook primed the pump, facilitating the good spirits that fostered agreement. Russia's continued access to those ready lenders ensured that the empire of the Tsars would not be tempted away from its alliance and entente partners. This web of financial and political interdependence affected both foreign policy and domestic society in all three countries. The Russian state was so heavily indebted to its western creditors, rendering those western economies almost prisoners to this debt, that the debtor nation in many ways had the upper hand; the Russian government at times was actually able to dictate policy to its French and British counterparts. Those nations' investing classes-which, in France in particular, spanned not only the upper classes but the middle, rentier class, as well-had such a vast proportion of their savings wrapped up in Russian bonds that any default would have been catastrophic for their own economies. That default came not long after the Bolshevik Revolution brought to power a government who felt no responsibility whatsoever for the debts accrued by the tsars for the purpose of oppressing Russia's workers and peasants. The ensuing effect on allied morale, the French and British economies and, ultimately, on the Anglo-French relationship, was grim and far-reaching. This book will contribute to understandings of the ways that non-governmental and sometimes transnational actors were able to influence both British and French foreign policy and Russian foreign and domestic policy. It will address the role of individual financiers and policy makers-men like Lord Revelstoke, chairman of Baring Brothers, the British and French Rothschild cousins, Edouard Noetzlin of the Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas, and Sergei Witte, Russia's authoritative finance minister during much of this age of expansion; the importance of foreign capital in late imperial Russian policy; and the particular role of British capital and financial investment in the construction and strengthening of the Anglo-Russo-French entente. It will illustrate the interrelationship of political and economic decision-making with the ideas and beliefs that inform security policy. Drawing upon both the traditional archival sources for diplomatic history-the government holdings of Great Britain, France, and Russia-and the non-governmental archival holdings of international finance-this project looks beyond the realm of high politics and state-centered decision making in the formation of foreign policy, offering insights into the forms and functions of diplomatic alliances while elucidating the connections between finance and foreign policy. It is a classic tale of money and power in the modern era-an age of economic interconnectivity and great power interdependency.

This book's most important contribution is in uncovering the trove of documents in the archives of France, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Russia's foreign loans and, in general, Russiaâs relationship with European financial institutions, have previously been the subjects of several important works, but none of them used such an array of archival materials in Europe. * Ekaterina Pravilova, The Russian Review *
Jennifer Siegel has written a gripping and entirely convincing narrative of the financial struggle that preceded the outbreak of war in 1914, and a fine account of the way in which a weak power used debt to manipulate the diplomacy of the stronger powers. * Harold James, Princeton University *
This is a fascinating and original work on the role of British and French finance in their relations with late-imperial but also early-Soviet Russia. Both diplomatic and financial history are unfashionable among contemporary Western historians: all the more refreshing therefore to read a truly path-breaking work dedicated to this topic. Professor Siegel brings to this study not just much research in a range of Russian and Western archives but also insights derived from her own first-hand experience of the financial world. Anyone interested in not just Russian history but also international relations in the era of the First World War should read this book. * Dominic Lieven, author of Towards the Flame: The End of Tsarist Russia *
Jennifer Siegel's superbly researched and powerfully argued monograph provides an exciting new perspective on the era of the First World War. For Peace and Money illuminates the crucial role played by financial diplomacy in the evolution of the Triple Entente before 1914, in the political dynamics of the Allied cause during the Great War, and in the international effort to rebuild European politics and society after that conflict. Siegel's highly original analysis challenges us to rethink the politics of indebtedness among Great Powers. The result is an ambitious reinterpretation of international relations during this period of profound upheaval and systemic change. * Peter Jackson, author of Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War *
In this important study, Siegel documents the role played by French and British lenders in underwriting Russia's transformation into a modern industrial and military power before World War I and the allies' financial support of the empire's participation in that conflict. Written in accessible prose and supported by impressive evidence from all three countries, this study reminds readers of the central role of finance in international relations, while showing them that its role is often more ambiguous than they might expect. * David McDonald, University of Wisconsin-Madison *

Jennifer Siegel is an Associate Professor of History at Ohio State University and the author of Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (I.B. Tauris, 2002).