Philosophy without Intuitions

2.90 ( 21 Ratings by Goodreads)
Philosophy without Intuitions

Philosophy without Intuitions

2.90 (21 Ratings by Goodreads)
paperback
Published: 6 March, 2014
Standard worldwide delivery by Wed, July 8 - Mon, July 13
Order within 0
Condition: NEW
$59.42
Price includes shipping
Available 20 in stock
- +
FREE Returns within 30 days

Description

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
See more

More Details

Type Book
ISBN13 9780198703020
ISBN10 0198703023
Number Of Pages 256
Item Weight 308 g
Product Dimensions 142 x 216 x 14 mm
Publisher / Reseller Oxford University Press
Format paperback
See More +

Media Reviews

a wonderfully clear, largely well-argued case against a central assumption of many contemporary metaphilosophers ... I highly recommend it. * Daniel Cohnitz, Disputatio *
engaging and exciting ... Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it. * Jonathan Ichikawa, International Journal for Philosophical Studies *
an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate * Stephen Ingram, Metaphilosophy *

Show more

GoodReads Reviews

Author's Bio

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and three books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore), and Relativism and Monadic Truth (with John Hawthorne).

Show more